

OPTIMAL QUANTUM ALGORITHM FOR POLYNOMIAL INTERPOLATION

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Let $f(X) = c_d X^d + \dots + c_1 X + c_0 \in \mathbb{F}_q[X]$ be an unknown polynomial of degree d , specified by its coefficient vector $c \in \mathbb{F}_q^{d+1}$. Suppose q and d are known and we are given a black box that evaluates f on any desired $x \in \mathbb{F}_q$. We are interested in determining how many queries are required to determine the vector $c \in \mathbb{F}_q^{d+1}$.

The classical query complexity of this problem is well known: $d + 1$ queries to f are clearly sufficient and are also necessary to determine the polynomial, even with bounded error. Shamir used this fact to construct a cryptographic protocol that divides a secret into $d + 1$ parts such that knowledge of all the parts can be used to infer the secret, but any d parts give no information about the secret [17]. The security protocol relies on the fact that if f is chosen uniformly at random, and if we only know d function values $f(x_1), \dots, f(x_d)$, then we cannot guess the value $f(x_{d+1})$ for a point $x_{d+1} \notin \{x_1, \dots, x_d\}$ with probability greater than $1/q$ (that is, there is no advantage over random guessing).

We [6] describe an optimal quantum algorithm that uses k quantum queries to infer the coefficients of an unknown polynomial $f \in \mathbb{F}_q[X]$ of known degree d . Using this algorithm, we show that the lower bounds in previous works [11, 14] are tight: $k = d/2 + 1/2$ queries suffice to solve the problem with constant success probability. While the success probability at this value of k has a q -independent lower bound, it decreases rapidly with k , scaling like $1/k!$. This raises the question of how the success probability increases as we make more queries. We show that there is a sharp transition as k is increased: with $k = d/2 + 1$ queries, the algorithm succeeds with a probability that approaches 1 for large q . We also show that our algorithm is precisely optimal: it achieves the highest possible success probability of any k -query algorithm.

Finally, we consider the gate complexity of polynomial interpolation. We call an algorithm *gate-efficient* if it can be implemented with a number of 2-qubit gates that is only larger than its query complexity by a factor $\text{poly}(\log q)$. We construct a gate-efficient variant of the optimal algorithm that achieves almost the same success probability.

Our algorithm can be applied to improve results of Boneh and Zhandry giving quantum attacks on certain cryptographic protocols [3]. For a version of the Shamir secret sharing scheme where the shares can be quantum superpositions, their d -query interpolation algorithm shows that a subset of only d parties can recover the secret. Our algorithm considerably strengthens this, showing that a subset of $d/2 + 1/2$ parties can recover the secret with constant probability, and $d/2 + 1$ can recover it with probability $1 - O(1/q)$. Boneh and Zhandry also formulate a model of quantum message-authentication codes (MACs), where the goal is to tag messages in a way that authenticates the sender. Informally, a MAC is called d -time if, given the ability to create d valid message-tag pairs, an attacker cannot forge another valid message-tag pair. Boneh and Zhandry show that there are $(d + 1)$ -wise independent functions that are not d -time quantum MACs. Our result improves to show that there are $(d + 1)$ -wise independent functions that are not $(d/2 + 1/2)$ -time quantum MACs.

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